Their treatment of such human rights political participation, freedom of conscience, and religious toleration demonstrate, Oh says, that Islam should have a ...

What kind of reference (if any) do terms such as “pencil,” “chair,” “television,” and so on have? On the matter, a de-bate between directly referential theorists and descriptiv-ist theorists is open. It is largely acknowledged that natural kind terms (such as “water,” “gold,” “tiger,” etc.) are directly referential expressions (cf. Putnam,1975). That is, they are expressions whose reference is determined by their refer-ents' nature, independent of whether we know or will ever know what this nature is. However, it does not (...) seem like-wise convincing that all artifactual kind terms (like “pen-cil,” “chair,” “television,” etc.) semantically behave the same. Terms for artifactual kinds seem more likely to be subjected to a descriptivist view, that is, definable not by links to their extensions' nature but in terms of conjunctions or clusters of properties. In his celebrated “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” (1975), Hilary Putnam originated the mentioned debate by arguing that artifactual kind terms also refer directly. Thus, the discussion ultimately revolves around establishing whether artifactual and natural kind terms are both directly referential expressions. The authors engaged in this debate have tried to argue in favor of (or against) Putnam's proposal by highlighting the similarities (or differences) between nat-ural vis-à-vis artifactual kind words and their respective ref-erents. This paper aims to provide a thorough and reasoned overview of the debate at stake, pointing out trends and problems associated with each proposed account. (shrink)

In this paper I outline an account of the structure of perceptual justification that develops Wittgenstein’s thought that the possibility of acquiring any degree of justification for our beliefs depends on placing certain propositions outside the route of empirical inquiry, turning them into the ‘hinges’ of our rational evaluations. The proposal is akin to ‘moderate’ accounts of the structure of perceptual justification, but it conjoins Wittgenstein’s insight with explanationist and contrastivist ideas, and so differs in important respects both from such (...) accounts and from other versions of hinge epistemology. I maintain that the basic presuppositions of the epistemic practice of taking experience at face value are not totally refractory to evidential assessment, arguing that they can receive some degree of second-order empirical justification via inference to the best explanation. And I address the worry that the account may face the problem of ‘easy knowledge’ by helping myself to the contrastivist view that empirical knowledge is best understood as a three-place, contrastive relation between an agent, a proposition (or fact) and a contrast. This leads me to replace the usual closure principles for epistemic justification and knowledge with corresponding contrastive principles, filling in the final details of contrastive hinge epistemology. (shrink)

Une théorie qui veut établir les principes d'une science du droit, mais dont les fondements épistémologiques remontent aux premières années du XXe siècle, peut-elle garder sa validité de nos jours ?

The received view of Martin Heidegger’s work is that he leaves little room for reason in the practice of philosophy or the conduct of life. Citing his much-scorned remark that reason is the “stiff-necked adversary of thought”, critics argue that Heidegger’s philosophy effectively severs the tie between reason and normativity, leaving anyone who adheres to his position without recourse to justifying reasons for their beliefs and actions. Transcending Reason is a collection of essays by leading Heidegger scholars that challenges this (...) view by exploring new ways to understand Heidegger’s approach to the relationship between reason, normativity, and the philosophical methodology that gives us access to these issues. The volume points to Heidegger’s novel approach to reason understood in terms of what he calls Dasein’s ‘transcendence’—the ability to occupy the world as a space of normatively structured meanings in which we navigate our striving to be. By examining the strengths and weaknesses of this new and innovative take on Heidegger’s philosophy, this collection considers the possibility that he does not sever but rather reconceives the relation between reason and normativity. -/- . (shrink)

Hermann Cohen (1842-1918) -- Franz Rosenzweig (1886-1929) -- Martin Buber (1878-1965) -- Leo Strauss (1899-1973) -- Emmanuel Lévinas (1906-1995).

Written by two of the leading figures in the field, this is a lucid and systematic introduction to semantics as applied to transformational grammars of the ...

Proposed educational outcomes for the health humanities in medical education range from empathy to visual thinking skills to social accountability. This lack of widely agreed-upon high-level curricular goals limits humanities educators’ ability to design purposeful curricula toward clear, common ends and threatens justifications for scarce curricular time. We propose a novel approach to the hoped-for outcomes of health humanities training in medical schools, which has the potential to encompass traditional health humanities knowledge, skills, and behaviors while also being concrete and (...) measurable: humanistic practice. Humanistic practice, adapted from the concept of ethical sensitivity, is an intentional process of applying humanities knowledge and skills to a clinical scenario by 1) noticing that the scenario requires humanities knowledge or skills, 2) informing one’s clinical and interpersonal strategy and behavior with humanities knowledge or skills, 3) reflecting on the effectiveness of the strategy and behavior, and 4) reorienting to develop new approaches for future practice. The construct of humanistic practice may help address some of the foundational problems in health humanities outcomes research since it transcends the traditional diverse content domains in the health humanities, can link patient and provider experiences, and may bridge the divide among the additive, curative, and intrinsic epistemic positions of humanities to medical education. (shrink)

The “boomerang thesis” enjoys widespread currency in contemporary scholarship: that the means and ends of colonial domination would “spin back” to the metropole is an idea with intuitive grip. This article extrapolates the depth of meaning this metaphor contains, as well as what it conceals. It first considers the “boomerang” as it appears in Aimé Césaire’s Discourse on Colonialism, a poetic work that captures the moral and experiential return-effects of imperial violence. Turning to Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism—the only (...) articulation of the thesis that uses the word “boomerang”—the article disaggregates the teleological, ideological, and institutional elements that spun back from European colonies in the imperial era. Finally, it traces the development of the thesis in Michel Foucault’s “Society Must Be Defended,” where it is transformed into a more general explanatory mechanism. Each theorist indicates how distance operates to transform dubious, even hateful ideas into acceptable practices. (shrink)

Manuel Herrera Gómez es Profesor Titular de Sociología de la Universidad de Granada (1998). Sus publicaciones más recientes son Las políticas sociales en las sociedades complejas (2003), Sociedades complejas (2004), Metateoría de las Ciencias Sociales (2005), La cultura de la sociedad en Talcott Parsons (2005) y Teorías y métodos de planificación social (2005). También ha coordinado las obras Administración Pública y Estado de Bienestar (2004) y Teorías sociológicas de la acción (2005). En las últimas décadas se ha desarrollado un (...) intenso debate que contrapone a los defensores de un modelo liberal de sociedad y a los que apuestan por un modelo comunitario. Bajo el manto liberal se engloban todas aquellas teorías políticas cuyo objetivo es buscar procedimientos, universalmente compartidos, de agregación de los intereses individuales. Por su parte, en el bando comunitarista, nos encontramos aquellos planteamientos -cuyo denominador común es una crítica a toda visión puramente procedimentalista de la filosofía pública-, que consideran que sólo se posee una comunidad política cuando se recurre a un patrimonio común de contenidos, valores y tradiciones, en el que todos los miembros de la comunidad se sienten radicados. En esta obra se presenta un análisis detallado de los protagonistas y de las etapas de este debate, proponiendo como conclusión un modelo de sociedad que pretende dar respuesta tanto a las instancias radicadas en el modelo procedimental como a las presentes en el modelo comunitario. (shrink)

The commentaries on the Ethica nova and the Ethica vetus written by some masters of the arts – presumably operating in the Paris faculty – in the first half of the thirteenth century expound in an original way the doctrine of the virtutes consuetudinales which Aristotle, at the end of the first book of his Ethica (I 13), distinguishes into the two main classes of the “moral virtues” and the “intellectual virtues”. The present paper aims at highlighting the particularly important (...) task which is assigned to the intellectual virtues in these early commentaries: joining man to God directly, through a contemplation which becomes love. The masters of the arts maintain that the moral virtues, in spite of the definition given by Aristotle (habitus a quo quis bonus est et opus eius bene reddit), are not sufficient alone to bring man to perfection, but that other more perfect virtues, namely the intellectual ones, are needed in order to make him know and love the supreme good. Having no knowledge of the sixth book of the Ethica, in which Aristotle deals in particular with the intellectual virtues, our masters know only their general description and are concerned with clarifying their relationships with the moral virtues, compared to which they appear to be sometimes really distinct and sometimes united to them in sharing the recta ratio, so much that they may constitute a double virtue. Although the masters of the arts seem to be well-informed about the teaching of the theologians – which they often cite without opposing to it, albeit stressing their own philosophical point of view –, it is significant that no reference whatsoever is made by them to the theological virtues and that they have recourse to the themes of Avicennian mysticism such as the doctrine of the two faces of the soul. Besides presenting the commentaries on the Ethica vetus from a general point of view, I will focus on the Paris commentary in Ethicam veterem (Paris BN lat. 3804A, ff. 152ra-159vb, 241ra-247vb; Paris BN lat. 3572, ff. 226ra-235ra), of which I am preparing a critical edition. The Paris commentary contains in fact a special and original discussion of the doctrine of the virtutes intellectuales. (shrink)

This paper aims to produce a defense of the ethical significance of Confucian ritual. An adequate defense must explain how these conventions are based in a culturally-neutral, objective ground. After a brief account of how Confucians view the relationship between rituals and moral goodness, I consider three sorts of justification. Mencian naturalism appeals to a conception of flourishing that is grounded in human nature. Xunzian consequentialism looks to how ritual brings about social order. I argue that both of these approaches (...) fail because they are unable to account for the normative fineness of rituals, which refers to the precision and detail of ritual propriety. Instead, I look to Xunzi for a justification of rituals in terms of their role in beautifying human nature. I argue that this view provides a sort of objective ground for ritual, while also preserving their normative fineness. I conclude with remarks on how Xunzian aestheticism may be useful for understanding other areas of moral life. (shrink)

Propositional justification pertains to propositions: it is the sort of justification that a proposition enjoys for an agent when the agent is epistemically justified to believe it. By contrast, doxastic justification is justification of beliefs, i.e., of doxastic states actually instantiated by an agent. The ‘orthodox’ view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification is that the latter should be explained in terms of the former, so that an agent’s belief is (doxastically) justified just in case (i) it is (...) a belief in a proposition that is (propositionally) justified for the agent and (ii) it is held on the basis of that which (propositionally) justifies its content. This view has been challenged by John Turri in his paper ‘On the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic Justification’ (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 80, 2010, pp. 312–326). There he offers two putative counterexamples to the orthodoxy and goes on to argue that the order of explanation should be reversed: it is propositional justification that should be explained in terms of doxastic justification, and not vice versa. Though I share Turri’s feeling that there is something amiss with the way a number of contemporary epistemologists talk of propositional and doxastic justification, I do not believe he has managed to put his finger on the real trouble. So the first point I make is that his counterexamples fall short of refuting the orthodox view, which I argue should be maintained. Then I try to diagnose the real source of the trouble. It lies, I suggest, in the way a number of recent epistemologists talk of propositional justification, a way which commits them to the questionable view that the basis upon which facts concerning propositional justification supervene does not include facts concerning the doxastic states of agents, but only facts concerning the evidence to which agents have access. So I observe that there are different degrees of idealisation involved in judgments of ‘propositional justification’, propose to distinguish what an agent is propositionally justified to believe given his overall doxastic state from what an agent is propositionally justified to believe irrespective of his overall doxastic state, and argue that, whenever it is the former relation that is at stake, an agent can be propositionally justified to believe a proposition p at time t only if it is reasonably easy for him to form a doxastically justified belief in p at t. It is most likely an awareness of this fact, or of some fact in the vicinity, that encourages the belief that propositional justification should be explained in terms of doxastic justification. But I suggest that this fact, far from being evidence that the notion of doxastic justification is in any sense more fundamental than that of propositional justification, can be accounted for by paying attention to the relationship that links the relevant sort of (epistemic) justification to (epistemic) responsibility. So I conclude that there is an important sense in which facts concerning epistemic justification supervene not merely on facts concerning the evidential states of agents, but on facts concerning their overall doxastic states. (shrink)

Background:Decision-making and assessment in emergency situations are complex and result many times in ethical conflicts between different healthcare professionals.Aim:To analyse and describe situations that can generate ethical conflict among nurses working in emergency situations.Methods:Qualitative analysis. A total of 16 emergency nurses took part in interviews and a focus group.Ethical considerations:Organisational approval by the University Hospital, and informed consent and confidentiality were ensured before conducting the research.Result/conclusion:Two categories emerged: one in ‘ethical issues’ and one in ‘emotions and feelings in caring’. The (...) four ethical subcategories are presented: Autonomy, the first sub category: first, the nurse’s ability to practise care on an emergency ward and, second, to support the patient and/or relatives in terms of care and medical treatment. The conflicts arise when the nurse ends up in the middle between the patient and the physician responsible for the diagnosis and treatment from a nature scientific perspective. Reification of injured body: patient was often reified and fragmented, becoming just a leg or arm. Different factors contributed in this perspective. Pain: pain relief was often inadequate but more effectively treated in the emergency medical services than at the emergency department. The nurses highlighted the phenomenon of suffering because they felt that pain was only an object, forgetting the patients’ care need, like separating mind from body. Death: the nurses felt that the emergency services are only prepared to save lives and not to take care of the needs of patients with ‘end-of-life’ care. Another issue was the lack of ethical guidelines during a cardiac arrest. Resuscitation often continues without asking about the patient’s ‘previous wishes’ in terms of resuscitation or not. In these situations, the nurses describe an ethical conflict with the physician in performing their role as the patient’s advocate. The nurses express feelings of distress, suffering, anger and helplessness. (shrink)

This paper enquires into a paradigmatic change concerning the concept of motion: from a phenomenological conception of motion understood as a continuous and finite process of translation, to a physical conception of motion as rectilinear, uniform and continuous, that is, as an inertial state that if unhindered, can extend infinitely – the former held by Aristotle, the latter by Koyré, a shift that is evidenced by their contrasting treatment of Zeno’s paradoxes. I argue that both ontologies of motion can be (...) understood in phenomenological terms: Motion is accomplished by the real itself. However, while Aristotle’s continuous motion as actualization of the form of a given body involves its formal determination and constitution of sense, Koyré’s conceives of motion and rest as kinds of being and motion itself as exemplifcation of the mathematization of nature that Husserl described in the Crisis. Taken together, these changes presuppose a transformation of metaphysical and epistemic frameworks. (shrink)

Philosophy Compass, Volume 17, Issue 9, September 2022.

Nuestro frenesí de comunicación e información hace que las cosas des- aparezcan y devengan en no-cosas, también llamadas informaciones (Han, 2021: 10). El marco ontológico presente es resultado de un desplazamiento que va del ocaso de las cosas al consumo rápido y frenético de no-cosas. En este entorno intangible el ser humano ya no maneja ninguna cosa. Las no cosas son aquellas cosas puramente intangibles, que no pueden aprehenderse con las manos. Lo único que le queda de las manos al (...) ser humano que habita este entorno son las yemas de los dedos con las que presiona las teclas para jugar con símbolos (Flusser, 2002: 107). ¿Qué efectos contrae este nuevo paradigma vital en el campo de la educación? ¿Qué significa educar en y trabajar con no-cosas? (shrink)

1. Two Approaches to the EarthIn several postwar texts, the earth increasingly receives attention from Carl Schmitt.1 In The Nomos of the Earth, the most important of these texts, he refers to Friedrich Hölderlin, a much earlier, very different author, who also considers the subject of the earth. Even though the positions of both are, ultimately, quite similar, they maintain significant terminological differences. Schmitt and Hölderlin both employ the word “nomos,” but in very different ways. Hölderlin regards “nomos” as “law” (...) in the sense of “positive” norm or “Gesez.”2 This use of “nomos” as “Gesez” differs from a second notion of law as the meaning operating at the basis of what Hölderlin calls the “sphere.” The sphere is a meaningful whole in which man originally exists. Law is here the very relations of the sphere as a meaningful whole. Hölderlin calls it the law in a “negative” sense.3 This second notion of law by Hölderlin (negative law or law as the meaning at the basis of the sphere) coincides precisely with the Schmittian idea of “nomos” as an “order of meaning [Sinnreich],”4 what he also calls the law in an “ontonomous and existential” sense.5 The first use of law as “nomos” or “Gesez” by Hölderlin coincides with Schmitt’s use of “Gesetz”: of law as “positive” law. (shrink)

L’enfant placé a souvent vécu des traumatismes qui ont impacté sa capacité à réguler ses émotions dans les relations interpersonnelles. Afin d’aider les assistants familiaux et les parents à mieux s’ajuster à l’enfant ont été instaurés des temps d’observation dans les conditions naturelles des interactions adulte-enfant qui ont été enregistrés en vidéo. Le vidéo-feedback a ensuite été utilisé avec chacun des adultes. L’exemple de Matthias montre comment ce dispositif a permis aux parents d’identifier les conséquences de leur comportement sur leur (...) enfant. L’exercice a été plus difficile pour l’assistante familiale davantage centrée sur ses besoins. (shrink)

The aim of this research is to develop and validate a measurement scale for consumer’s perceptions of corporate social responsibility using the three-dimensional social, environmental and economic conceptual approach as a theoretical basis. Based on the stages of measurement scale creation and validation suggested by DeVellis and supported by Churchill Jr.’s :64–73, 1979) suggestions, five different empirical studies are developed expressly and applied to consumers of tourist services. This research involves 1147 real tourists from 24 countries in two different cultural (...) and geographical contexts. A three-dimensional 18-item scale is proposed for measuring consumer perceptions of corporate social, environmental and economic responsibilities. This paper presents the complete development of the scale, as well as the implications and limitations of the main findings and the managerial implications. (shrink)

RESUMENLa segunda etapa del pensamiento filosófico de Ayer es conocida como «fenomenalismo analítico» y se caracteriza por su afirmación: lo que conoce el sujeto no son más datos sensoriales. Esto conlleva la necesidad de de crear lo que se conoce como el lenguaje de «los datos sensoriales», que debería ser previo al lenguaje ordinario y al que podría traducirse el primero mediante la provisión de una serie de reglas con este objeto. Los problemas y las críticas, conectados con la caracterización (...) de que sea un «dato sensorial» surgieron muy pronto y tales problemas provocaron que el propio Ayer fuese obligado a redefinir su posición filosófica.PALABRAS CLAVE:DATO SENSORIAL, FENOMENALISMO ANALÍTICO, ENTIDAD CUASIFÍSICA, ENTIDAD LINGÜÍSTICAABSTRACTThe second phase of Ayer’s philosophical thought is known as «analytical phenomenalism» and is characterized by his assertion: what the subject knows is not but sense data. This involved the need of creating what is known as the language of «sense data», which should be prior to the ordinary language, and into which the last one could be translated, by means of providing a series of rules on this purpose. Problems and criticism, linked to the characterization of what a «sense datum» could be, arose very soon, and such problems and criticism forced Ayer to redefine his philosophical position.KEY WORDS.SENSE DATUM, ANALYTICAL PHENOMENALISM, QUASI-PHYSICAL ENTITY, LINGUISTIC ENTITY. (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

ABSTRACT In times of crisis, interpersonal and group solidarity often emerge as people face critical challenges that threaten their survival. However, it remains unclear whether spontaneous solidarity practices are enough to effectively face such crisis situations. In this paper, we argue that to be fully effective, solidarity must be deployed through all its political tiers, from interpersonal and group relationships to institutional and legal normativity. We contend that solidarity relations can only reach an enduring goal if they solidify into stable (...) principles that can be acknowledged and enacted at the institutional level. Through an examination of recent literature and concrete case studies, the paper investigates the linkages and mutual dependencies between the various levels of solidarity developed throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. This analysis may allow us to answer the question of whether a “Multilevel European Solidarity” is a realistic goal, and what is required to achieve it. (shrink)

La libertad tiene un valor sistemático fundamental en la filosofía de Kant. En la filosofía práctica, ella es condición de la acción en sentido eminente. Tanto en la _Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres_, cuanto en la _Crítica de la razón práctica_, Kant intenta probar la libertad. La argumentación en ambas obras es distinta. El presente trabajo hace foco especialmente en la justificación de la segunda _Crítica_. En ella, Kant plantea que de la libertad sabemos gracias al hecho de (...) la consciencia moral o de una ley que vincula al sujeto incondicionadamente. Se intentará mostrar, a partir de una consideración de los textos de Kant, las obras de algunos intérpretes, así como en una reflexión sistemática, que la libertad, y el hecho de la consciencia moral, requieren de un acceso a la espontaneidad práctica por parte del sujeto, asunto que Kant deja sugerido en algunos pasajes. (shrink)

Friedrich Hölderlin argued that consciousness requires division and unity. Consciousness emerges through the fundamental distancing of the subject from its surroundings, without which the subject-object distinction would collapse and both objectivity and consciousness would be lost. Nevertheless, insofar as conscious knowledge is unitary, division demands a ground for unity. Hölderlin calls this ground ‘Being [Seyn].’ However, once Being is affirmed, the question of how it is accessed arises. Hölderlin’s scholars disagreed on this issue. This disagreement gave rise to two camps: (...) those who deny that Hölderlin accepts the idea of direct access to Being and believe that he proves Being through an act of reflection (Henrich); and those who argue that for Hölderlin, ‘Being’ is directly accessed. Those who hold the latter position can be further divided into those who conceive of this direct access as knowledge (Frank) and those who argue that this access does not have a cognoscitive character, but rather an aesthetic one (Waibel). This article considers these positions and shows that the direct apprehension of ‘Being’ is part of Hölderlin’s argument aimed at solving a fundamental problem; an argument that differs both from the postulate of access to Being as knowledge of transcendence and from the affirmation of a purely aesthetic mode of access. (shrink)